The first meeting of the official representatives of Russia and Georgia held in Switzerland within the framework of settlement the Russian-Georgian relations, has not given any concrete results. There is every reason to believe that this will continue, and the planned meetings held "once within two or three months", will be another stillborn pseudo-diplomatic format like the "Geneva talks." This, certainly, will not affect the Russian-Ossetian relations and the situation in South Ossetia as a whole.
According to a special representative of the Georgian Premier Zurab Abashidze, "conducting a dialogue with Russia is a requirement of the population of Georgia, a mood of residents of the country", and, moreover, "normalization of relations with Russia, is supported by our Western partners." Former Ambassador to Russia has called the Russian-Georgian talks the "dead-end topic". "It concerns the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which is associated with the territorial integrity of Georgia," but he considers that it is "better to stay in touch, and thus gradually resolve the deadlock."
But is it real to overcome the "endless deadlock" in the Russian-Georgian relations? The problem of improving them is much more serious than consider Georgia`s lobbyists and foreign observers. The matter is in fundamental impossibility of making the due "road map", in any case, at this stage.
Georgia cannot restore diplomatic relations with Russia, broken off by Georgia after Russia`s recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, August 26, 2008, until Moscow withdraw from its decision. However, such withdrawal would have catastrophic consequences for the Russian state and, above all, a complete loss of authority of the federal government in the North Caucasus, which would be followed by a loss of control over the region, and then the collapse of Russia. Tbilisi, Brussels and Washington should realize the fundamental impossibility of Moscow's refusal to recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Currently they have not realized this fact yet.
In turn, Georgia also can not abandon the concept of "restoring the territorial integrity," because it is the basis of the modern world view of the Georgian society, as a "cement solution" of the Georgian statehood. In the foreseeable future Moscow can use the appeals to Tbilisi to recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia and renounce claims to control over their territories only as the propaganda slogans.
The second "stumbling block" in the Russian-Georgian relations is the theme of Euro-Atlantic integration of Georgia, which is also a serious threat to Russia's national security due to the possibility of using the Georgian territory in NATO operations against Russia and its allies. If Georgia's accession to the EU is a distant and unrealistic prospect, its joining NATO may take place within the next few years in accordance with the desire of the western partners. A major problem, that Tbilisi can`t resolve, is to abandon its intention to join NATO and thus allow Russia to maintain security on both sides of the Caucasus Mountains.
It turns out that the Russian-Georgian relations are complicated by contradictions, the resolution of which in the interests of Russia in the near future is objectively impossible. In addition to this, the team of Ivanishvili ideologically and, partly, individually, is a "second edition" of the Saakashvili regime, sharing its foreign policy objectives and revanchist sentiments on the "restoration of the territorial integrity of Georgia."
Moreover, Russia is not interested at all in the resumption of diplomatic relations with Georgia and the opening of the Russian-Georgian border in exchange for insignificant concessions in Georgian foreign, in particular, the North Caucasus policy or in opening its market for Georgian goods. In any case, the trade and economic issues should be decided after the resolution of fundamental issues of regional security, especially as the interest in it is shown by Georgia.
Therefore, Russia should once and for all give up the illusion of a possible "breakthrough" in bilateral relations and the hopes for "good will" of the Ivanishvili government. In the upcoming negotiations, Russia should take the lead and impose its own game rules based on the principle positions. The requirements of Moscow to Tbilisi should include the signing by Georgia of non-aggression treaties against South Ossetia and Abkhazia, as well as renunciation of joining NATO by Georgia (or, at least, the exclusion of this task from the top-priority list).
The main thing, however, is that all regional and out-regional players need to understand that Russia's policy in South Ossetian and Abkhazian sector is self-sufficient and does not depend on the development of the Russian-Georgian relations. Sovereign status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, recognized by the Russian Federation, is neither the topic of discussions with Tbilisi, nor the "bargaining chip" in talks with the team of Ivanishvili.
Jana Amelina, Head of the Caucasus Studies Department of the Russian Institute for Strategic Research
